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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GAYLE SOUTH ARGYLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ARTHUR MITCHELL ARGYLE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce. 
Case No. 19ll0 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted plaintiff a divorce, custody of a minor 
child, $350 per month for the support of the minor child, items of 
property then in her possession, a cash settlement of $463,000 in lieu 
of all other property rights, to be paid $100, 000 within six months from 
January 6, 1983, and the balance of $363 ,000 to be paid over a 15-year 
period together with interest on the unpaid balance at the rate of 10% 
percent per annum, defendant to pay 15 equal annual installments of 
$·11. 138 05 each, including principal and interest and $2, 000 as an 
dtturney's fee, plus costs of court. 
- 1 -
43a 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON Al'l'EAL 
Appellant seeks reverc,a\ of the judgment and remand to the lr1al 
court for a determination of the value of the assets owned by appellant 
and entry of a decree that is equitable. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married on September 29, 1955, and 
lived together as husband and wife in Randolph, Utah, until November 
1982, when plaintiff moved to Evanston, Wyoming (Tr. 9). The parties 
had five children, all but one of whom had reached their majority at the 
time of trial (Tr 10). 
The appellant, Arthur Argyle, had been a rancher all his life and 
was employed by Argyle Ranch, Inc. (Tr. 132). The ranch had been 
established by his father and had been operated by his father until his 
death in 1949. At that time, management of the ranch was taken over 
by Arthur's mother, Emma Ireta Argyle (Tr. 184). She operated the 
ranch with the help of her sons until September 1963, at which time she 
decided to take steps to keep the ranch in the family. She made a gift 
to Arthur and his brother Ralph Argyle of some property to be 
contributed by them to a new corporation in exchange for stock. The 
mother, in exchange for stock, con trihu ted some 2. 700 acres of real 
property, livestock, machinery. person;d property and eq u1pmen t 
For the real property g-i\'en t•J Arthur and Ralph by their motht'r 
and subsequently transferred to the corporation. each 0f the brothers 
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received 10, 000 shares of stock in Argyle Ranch, Inc. , having a par 
value of $1. 00 per share. At the same time, and as part of an 
"Agreement to Incorporate and Declaration of Gift" (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 5), Arthur received 18 ,000 shares as a gift and Ralph received 
18, 000 shares as a gift. A total of 73, 000 shares was issued to her. 
The mother agreed to sell to each of her two sons 3, 000 shares per 
year at a par value of $1. 00 per share for a total of five years, so that 
after that period each of them, Arthur, Ralph, and Emma Ireta, would 
own 43, 000 shares. As a device to keep the corporation in the Argyle 
family, the agreement contained the following provision: 
5. In the event that any of the parties to this 
agreement desire to sell their shares of stock in said 
corporation they shall first give notice of their intention so to 
do to the remaining parties, who shall have 30 days within 
which to exercise the option to purchase the withdrawing 
parties' or party's shares of stock, which shall be sold and 
purchased at par value. The parties agree that they will not 
offer stock they desire to sell to any other party until the 
remaining shareholders of stock have had the opportunity of 
exercising the option to purchase said stock. Notice of 
intention to sell shall be given in writing. 
6. The terms of the sale shall be upon the payment of 
10% of the par value of the stock sold per year, plus 3% 
interest, with the payments to commence 12 months from the 
date of the exercising of the option to purchase. 
7 On the death of EMMA IRET A the remaining 
partners or partner, as the case may be, are hereby given 
an option to purchase the shares of stock held by said EMMA 
IRET A, at par value, in 10 annual installments, plus 
interest, each commencing 12 months after the death of said 
EMMA !RETA. and on the same day of each year thereafter 
until said stock has been purchased at the par value thereof, 
and the purchaser or purchasers of the stock of said EMMA 
I RETA shall have the option to pay at any accelerated rate 
they may choose. 
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The agreement was signed by Emma lreta Argyle, Arthur Mitchell 
Argyle, Ralph Evan Argyle, and the respondent herein, Gay IP 1\r'gyle 
The option was put into the agreement because of Emma's fear that 
someone might want to pull out or to try and hold another partner up 
for too much money (Tr. 185). 
Emma continued active in managment of the company until about 
1975, when she first became incapacitated, following which she died. 
Upon her death, her sons, Ralph and Arthur, enforced the buy-sell 
agreement as against her estate (Tr. 186). Since its execution, the 
agreement has not been modified in any respect (Tr. 186, 187) 
Arthur had been vice-president of the corporation, but upon the 
death of his mother six years ago, he became acting president. He 
then owned 43, 000 shares and Ralph owned 43, 000 shares of the total of 
129,000 shares outstanding (Tr. 133) 
As with the herders and other employees of the ranch, Arthur has 
been furnished with a home, board, utilities, and a vehicle to be used 
in connection with ranching operations. At the time of trial, he was 
drawing a salary of $200 to $300 per month, and the ranching company 
was paying $1, 100 a month to Gayle to help Arthur meet the obligations 
of a temporary order (Tr. 146). There was no evidence as to the basis 
for this advance by the ranching company, , whether it was to be 
repaid as a loan, or whether there was to he some adiustment made in 
the relative shareholdings of Ralph and Arthur Exceµt for the sh;ires 
he owns in the corporation, Arthur's unly assets 3n· a frw things in 
the house (Tr. 147). 
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Although Gayle signed a deed in 1963 by which the property of 
Arthur and Ralph was conveyed to the corporation, the property had 
been conveyed in the first instance by Emma Ireta to Arthur and 
Ralph, not to Gayle (Tr. 60). During the years of the marriage, Gayle 
did work on the ranch, worked in a restaurant, and performed duties 
as a housewife. When her father died in 1976, Gayle signed papers so 
that her mother would receive all of his holdings, Gayle giving up any 
right she had in the estate (Tr. 55). One of the properties that came 
down from her father was a timber company, for which she was working 
at the time of the trial (Tr. 56). 
Mark Crystal, an appraiser, was employed by Gayle to determine 
the market value of the assets owned by Argyle Ranch, Inc. (Tr. 68). 
Over objection to his testimony on the ground that it did not relate to 
the value of the shares owned by Arthur, Crystal testified that the 
market value of the ranch was $3 ,489, 249, but this did not take the 
company's debt into account (Tr. 130). He admitted that the values 
given would be more useful for liquidation of the corporation over a 
period of years (Tr. 118), the valuation having been based upon the 
valuation of the various pieces of property that comprised the ranch, 
by a comparable sales method, and the valuations of items of equipment, 
and livestock (Tr. 74-113) Mr. Crystal made no attempt to appraise 
the value of the stock. This was out of his field (Tr. 131). 
Using a different method of valuation, Richard T. Huffman, a real 
estate broker, land use consultant, and appraiser valued the ranch at 
$2, 235, 500 (Tr. 208), less the amount of the indebtedness, which was 
approximately $1,300,000 (Tr 169). 
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Financial statements prepared by Argyle Ranch, Inc , for the 
Production Credit Administration were admitted in evidence as plamtiff's 
Exhibit 6, and defendant's Exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9. The most recent, 
dated December 2, 1982, showed total assets of $2, 992, 855 and total 
liabilities of $1,030,847, leaving a net worth of $1,962,008 (defendant's 
Exhibit 6), but there was testimony that additional debt had been 
incurred since the date of the statement. 
The court ignored the testimony of both of the experts and found 
the value of the assets of the corporation to be $1, 962, 008. 00, the 
exact sum set out in financial statment of December 2, 1982. Although 
there was no finding, as such, with respect to value, in its Conclusion 
of Law No. 4 the court stated: 
That plaintiff shall be awarded a cash settlement in lieu of all 
other property rights except as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 
3 hereof, in the sum of Four Hundred Sixty Three Thousand 
Dollars ($463, 000), rep res en ting one-half of the value in the 
defendant's stock in the Argyle Ranch, Inc., this sum being 
based upon the assets of Argyle Ranch, Inc. , which form the 
basis for the value of the stock in Argyle Ranch, Inc. , the 
net value of said assets being $1, 962, 008. 00, from which is 
deducted the sum of $109, 000, representing a gift of land 
received from defendant's mother; the balance of this then 
being divided by one-half, which is the defendant's interest 
in Argyle Ranch, Inc. This balance is then divided in half, 
representing plantiff's interest in the property accumulated 
and included in the marital estate. The sum of One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000) being payable to plaintiff from 
defendant within six (6) months from January 6, 1983, with 
the balance of said sum of $363, 000. 00 being payable to 
plaintiff from defendant over a fifteen ( 15) year period, 
together with interest on the unpaid balance of $363, 000 00 
from August 6, 1983, payable as follows 
The sum of $363, 000 00, together with interest 
on the unpaid balance thereof at the rate of ten 
percent (10%) per annum, said interest beginning 
on August 6, 1983, shall be paid in 15 equal annual 
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installments of $4 7, 738. 05 each, including principal 
and interest, and the first of said payments shall 
be due and payable on or before August 6, 1984, 
and a like payment of $47, 738. 05 shall be due on 
the 6th day of August each and every consecutive 
year thereafter until the entire amount of 
$363,000.00, together with accrued interest thereon, 
shall be paid in full. All payments shall apply first 
to interest and second to the reduction of principal. 
During final argument, the court conceded that the buy-sell 
agreement between Ralph and Arthur was valid (Tr. 296), but there 
was no finding as to the effect of the agreement upon the valuation of 
the stock owned by Arthur, indeed there was no finding as to the 
valuation of his stock except as set out in the above conclusion. 
The corporate tax returns of Argyle Ranch, Inc., show that its 
taxable income for 1977 was $3, 702. 95 (defendant's Exhibit 10), for 1978 
was $21,157.49 (defendant's Exhibit 11), for 1979 was $32,019.03 
(defendant's Exhibit 12), and for 1980 was $25, 702 (defendant's 
Exhibit 13) 
The tax returns of Arthur and Gayle Argyle show that they had a 
taxable income in 1977 of $6, 575. 40 (defendant's Exhibit 14), in 1978 of 
$10,793 (defendant's Exhibit 15), in 1979 of $9,354.80 and in 1980 
$11,024.76 (defendant's Exhibit 17). 
ARGUMENT 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A MONEY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST ARTHUR ARGYLE IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$463, 000, OR ANY OTHER AMOUNT. 
- 7 -
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There was testimony from three experts, Mark Cry st al, Hichard T 
Huffman, and Blaine Davis Hales, and from Gayle Argyle and from 
Ralph Argyle concerning the values of the assets held by Argyle 
Ranch, Inc. There were also financial statements indicating the net 
worth of the corporation from 1978 through 1982 None of the 
witnesses, however, testified as to the value of the stock owned by 
Arthur Argyle in Argyle Ranch, Inc. , and it was not shown by any of 
the exhibits . 
It is undisputed that Argyle Ranch, Inc. , is a corporation, that 
the stock is held equally by Ralph Argyle and Arthur Argyle, that each 
of them owns 43, 000 shares of stock in the corporation, that they are 
presently purchasing from the estate of Emma Ireta Argyle an additional 
21, 500 shares each, and that approximately $20, 000 is still owed to the 
estate for the stock. 
Faced with some complex but insufficient evidence, the court took 
the easy way out. It looked at the most recent financial statement of 
the corporation (defendant's Exhibit 9) fixed its gaze on the "net 
worth" line, interpreted the net worth as the value of the corporation 
assets, and decided that the value of the corporation was $1, 962, 008. 
It deducted from this sum $109,000 representing the value fixed on the 
property conveyed to the corporation in 1963 by Emma Ire ta Argyle, 
apparently taking the view that this property was not marital proper\\' 
because it was a gift to the husband, but giving to the wife credit for 
20 years appreciation. After deduction of the $109, 000 the v:due of the 
corporation's assets was fixed at $1,853,008, and the valuP uf Ar·thur 
- 8 -
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Argyle's interest in the corporation at $926 ,504. The court divided this 
amount equally and entered a money judgment in favor of the wife for 
$463,252. 
The only virtue in this ruling was its simplicity. The court 
assumed, without any evidence, that the value of Arthur Argyle's stock 
in Argyle Ranch, Inc., was equal to one-half of the value of the 
underlying assets, less the debt. It was not asked to, and did not 
indicate that it intended to, take judicial notice that the value of stock 
in a closely held family corporation is equal to the value of the 
properties held by the corporation less the indebtedness owed by the 
corporation. Moreover, even if the court had been asked to take 
judicial notice of such a fact, it would not have been permitted to do 
so. How the stock of a particular corporation in a particular setting at 
a particular year is to be valued is not a matter of common knowledge, 
and it is not a specific fact or proposition of generalized knowledge 
which is capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to 
easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy. See Rule 9, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
Not only did the court fix a value of the stock without any 
evidence of its value, it gave no consideration to the fact that Arthur 
Argyle's stock was subject to an option exercisable by Ralph Argyle to 
purchase the stock for $1.00 per share for Arthur's 62,500 shares, if 
Arthur wanted to sell it. 
The agreement was entered into long before any dispute arose 
between the parties in this case. The architect of the agreement was 
- 9 -
43a 
Emma lreta Argyle, the mothec ,_,f Ralph and Arthur Argyle The 
plaintiff, Gayle Argyle, was completely aware of the agreement at the 
time it was entered into. Indeed, she participated in it by signing off 
any interest she might have had in the property being contributed by 
Arthur, and by signing the agreement herself. 
Such agreements, particularly when entered into under the 
circumstances that this agreement was entered into, are held to be valid 
and binding. 
In re Estate Mather, 410 Pa. 361, 189 A. 2d 586 (1963), involved 
an agreement containing the following provision: 
2. That in the event of the death of Gilbert Mather, 
or in the event of his offering his stock for sale during his 
life, he, for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, 
agrees to sell, and Victor C. Mather and Charles E. Mather, 
II agree to buy, in equal proportions, at One Dollar ($1. 00) 
per share, any or all of the common stock holdings of the 
said Gilbert Mather. 
4. That as to any or all of the above three provisions, 
the survivors or survivor among the class of purchasers in 
each case shall be entitled to the entire rights given the 
purchasers in each case. 
When Victor C. Mather died his executor sold his stock to Gilbert 
and Charles Mather for $1. 00 per share When Gilbert died in 1959, 
Charles II tendered $501 to his estate for the purchase of his 
501 shares of stock in the company At the time of the tender, the 
stock of Mather and Company was carneJ on the books at $-t-t-t. 9'.2 and 
its actual value was not less than $1. 060 per share The tender was 




After quoting from a prior Pennsylvania case to the effect that 
such agreements are not contrary to any overruling public policy, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said: 
The aforesaid written agreements, including the one in 
suit, were made between mature members of a close family and 
it is conceded that there was no overreaching or fraud or 
deceit. The facts and the lawfulness of the purpose were 
admitted by appellants. However, appellants argue that the 
agreement was an invalid restraint on alienation because the 
price was clearly very unfair and unchangeable. The 
contention that a stock option or purchase price must be 
flexible is unrealistic and utterly devoid of merit, even if we 
overlook the fact that the price was not unchangeable since in 
1939 the parties entered into the present written agreement 
changing the price on the option purchases and sales from 
$50. 00 to $1. 00. Moreover, we repeat, the agreement clearly 
and expressly set forth the intention of all the parties --
they wanted to keep the family business in the Mather family 
and to give each other and their personal representatives the 
options, rights and obligations hereinabove recited. * * * In 
this free land of ours where even a state cannot impair the 
obligations of a contract, we cannot understand how it can be 
seriously contended that this written family agreement -- and 
family agreements are always favored in the law -- when made 
by adult businessmen without any overreaching or fraud, is 
"a scrap of paper." [Emphasis by court.] 189 A. 2d at 590. 
Another buy-sell agreement was involved in Jones v. 
63 Wash. 2d 559, 388 P. 2d 539, 541-42 (1964), in which there was an 
obligation to sell stock at a price substantially less than its value. 
Repulsing an attack on the agreement, the Supreme Court of Washington 
said: 
* * * The contract cannot be said to have been unfair or 
inequitable when it was made, and now it is too clear to admit 
of interpretation- to include and emphasize equities, 
non-existent at the inception of the contract, but which have 
evolved and now seem persuasive. Many close corporations 
have similar buy-out provisions, and the courts would do a 
disservice to business practice by substituting an "appraisal" 
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or "market value" formula when hindsight shows that "book 
value," as originally conceived, become unrealistic with 
the passing of time. 
Other cases upholding similar agreements are Georesearch, Inc. v. 
Morriss, 193 F.Supp. 163, 173 (W.D. La. 1961); Cutter Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Twining, 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 34 Cal. Rptr. 317, 325 (1963), 
and Arentsen v. Sherman Towel Service Corporation, et al. 352 Ill. 
327, 185 N.E. 822 (1933). 
The validity of the Argyle buy-sell agreement was upheld by the 
District Court of Rich County in The Matter <2.f the Estate <2.f Emma Ireta 
Mitchell Argyle, also known as Emma Ireta Argyle, Deceased (Probate 
No. 433), of which the court took judicial notice. 
Appellant is not arguing that the court is bound to value the stock 
at $62, 500 (less the $10, 000 still owed), but he does argue, rightfully, 
that the court was required to take the stock purchase agreement into 
consideration. 
Suther v. Suther, 28 Wash. App. 838, 627 P. 2d 110 (1981), 
involved the valuation of corporate stock in a marriage dissolution 
proceeding. The court pointed out that valuation of shares of a closely 
held corporation presents a difficult prnblem calling for the weighing of 
relevant facts and ultimate exercise of reasoned iudgment Then it 
quoted the following from Lavene v Lavene. 162 N. J. Super. 187, 
392 A.2d 621, 623-24 (1978) 
- 12 -
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Valuation of stock in a closely held company is an 
attempt to determine the fair market value of an asset which 
by definition does not have a fair market value, since a 
ma_rket wherein a willing buyer will meet a willing seller, 
neither under a compulsion, generally does not exist. The 
stock of a closely held corporation is as a rule offered for 
sale only under unusual circumstances. The number of 
prospects is usually extremely limited. [Tierney, "A New 
Approach to the Valuation of Common Stock of Closely Held 
Companies," Journal Taxation 14 (July 1962).] 
As a result, the valuation of the stock of a closely held 
corporation requires an entirely different approach than the 
valuation of any other asset. The valuation process has been 
described as a "matter of judgment and opinion rather than 
mathematics." Banks, "Present Value and the Close 
Corporation", 49 TAXES The Tax Magazine, 33, 35 
(January 1971). Each case presents a unique factual 
question, the solution to which is not within the ambit of any 
exact science. The reasonableness of any valuation depends 
upon the judgment and experience of the appraiser and the 
completeness of the information upon which his conclusions 
are based. La winger, "Appraising Closely Held Stock --
Valuation Methods and Concepts," llO Trusts and Estates 816 
(October 1971). Suther, 627 P.2d at 112-ll3. - ---
After reviewing a number of cases dealing with the question, the 
Washington court concluded that although a buy-sell agreement is not 
necessarily determinative of a stock's value, a buy-sell agreement is a 
factor to be considered. 
In re Marriage of Rosan, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295, 
299 ( 1972), the trial court determined stock value by applying a formula 
in a buy-sell agreement and on appeal this was upheld, the appellate 
court observing that such conditions on disposition of the stock and its 
resulting illiquidity are factors which substantially affect its value. 
The right of Ralph Argyle to purchase the shares of Arthur Argyle for 
$1 00 per share is certainly a factor that would effect the liquidity of 
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the asset of Arthur Argyle and would affect the value of his stock m 
Argyle Ranch, Inc. 
A divorce proceeding is equitable in nature and this court may 
review both the law and the facts. Article VIII, Section 9, Utah 
Constitution; Read v. Read, 594 P. 2d 871, 872-873 (Utah 1979) And 
where the evidence is insufficient to support a trial court's valuation of 
a husband's interest in a corporation, the finding must be reversed. 
Christensen, 529 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Colo.App. 1974) 
II 
ENTRY OF A MONEY JUDGMENT FOR $463, 000, WITH 
$100,000 PAYABLE WITHIN SIX MONTHS, AND THE BALANCE 
TO DRAW INTEREST AT TEN PERCENT PER ANNUM WAS AN 
ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION. 
The evidence in this case was that the corporation's equity/debt 
ratio was about one to one or at most two to one, and that financial 
institutions, in considering whether to lend money to corporations 
generally require an equity/debt ratio of four or five to one. The 
evidence was also to the effect that Argyle Ranch, Inc. , has a heavy 
burden in servicing its present debt and that its borrowing capacity 
beyond that necessary for maintenance of the ranching operations is 
limited. Disposition of assets with corresponding liabilities would be 
disastrous. 
The evidence is also to the effect that except for his housing and 
food and utilities and trans portion, Arthur Argyle draws \·er·y little 
from the corporation, $200 to $300 a month in addition to the $1, 100 pi.:r 
- 14 -
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month he has had to obtain during the pendency of the action to pay to 
his wife. Given the financial condition of the corporation and the 
financial condition of Arthur Argyle, one cannot help but wonder how 
the trial court would expect him to be able to meet the terms of the 
judgment unless he were able to convince the other shareholder, Ralph 
Argyle, that the corporation should be liquidated and its assets 
distributed. 
In Phillips Phillips, 171 Colo. 127, 464 P. 2d 876 (1970), the 
husband's assets consisted of interests in partnerships, stock in nine 
local corporations, and some solely owned property. The trial court, in 
lieu of a property division, awarded the wife cash in the amount of 
$400, 000, of which $100, 000 was to be payable within one month of the 
date of the decree and the balance in installments of $12, 000 every 
three months, with interest payable quarterly at the rate of 5% per 
annum upon the deferred balance; $1, 050 per month for the support of 
three children; $250 alimony plus another $250 for any month that the 
husband might be delinquent, payment by the husband of all unpaid 
family accounts, and payment of the fees of attorneys, appraisers and 
accountants . 
On appeal the court found that the testimony of appraisers 
justified the award of $400,000 and the $1,050 per month child support 
and the $250 per month alimony, but it reversed the trial court because 
of the method required for payment of the award. The Supreme Court 
suggested that the trial court had an obligation to toil with the 
problems presented by the rather studied expressions by competent 
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appraisers and certified public account;rnts relating to the values of the 
marital property. In disapproving the court's requirement as to the 
methods of payment of the cash award, the court said 
The nature of a substantial part of the solely owned property 
of Mr. Phillips was such that it could not be liquidated 
quickly. The court found as follows: 
"[Mr. Phillips'] interest in the corporations and 
partnerships * * * cannot by reason of the nature 
of those businesses be immediately liquidated. Any 
attempt at an immediate liquidation would seriously 
impair [Mr. Phillips'] valued interest in the same." 
We have been unable to find anything in the record 
disputing Mr. Phillips' testimony that, if he were compelled to 
sell or liquidate a substantial portion of his interests, he 
would be bankrupt. We have already noted the aggregate 
indebtedness of $6, 370, 000. It appeared that the enterprises 
in which Mr. Phillips had fractional interests had inadequate 
working capital. This, combined with the tremendous 
liabilities, place Mr. Phillips in a position in which it would 
be difficult to borrow and disastrous to have forced 
liquidations. We are in agreement with his position that the 
order requiring payment of $100, 000 within a month and 
$12,500 each quarter upon the remaining sum of $300,000 was 
confiscatory and an abuse of discretion. 464 P. 2d at 879-80. 
The court also disapproved of the allowing of interest on the 
unpaid portions of the $400,000 and the $250 penalty for late payment 
of alimony. 
In Matter c:>[ Babb and Babb, 30 Ore. App. 581. 567 P 2d 599, 602 
( 1977), the court, among other things, awarded the wife a lump sum of 
$30,000 at 7% interest In disallowing the interest. the appellate court 
said: 
We agree that the interest pro\·ision will pla··" an undue 
financial burden on the husband and should be removed 1 t 
is true, as the wife argues, the payment scht·dul" pro\'tdt·s 
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for minimum payments and husband may reduce the interest 
liability by making larger payments. However, the assets of 
the parties are largely non-liquid and husband would either 
have to borrow money to pay a substantial payment and incur 
additional interest expense or utilize a large portion of his 
monthly income in order to reduce the interest obligation. 
In the instant case, the court is requiring a payment of $100,000 
within six months of its announcement from the bench of its decision, 
and the payment over 15 years of $363,000 at 10% interest. There was 
nothing in the evidence which would justify a conclusion by the trial 
court that the husband in this case would have any way of coming up 
with $100, 000 in six months or that he would be able to pay the sum of 
$363, 000, or that he would even be able to meet the interest burden. 
At 10% per annum, the interest on $363,000 is $36,300 a year or $3,025 
per month. The principal payments, if not amortized, would amount to 
$24, 200 per year for the 15-year period provided in the decree. By 
the terms of the decree the amount that the husband will have to pay 
over the 15-year period comes out at $716,070. 75. 
Instead of seeking an easy (for the court) solution, the court 
should have grappled with the problems presented by the illiquidity of 
Argyle Ranch, Inc. , by the corporate debt, and the profitability or 
unprofitability of the corporation, by the buy-sell agreement, and by 
the equal division of control of the corporation. 
The court also abused its discretion in not taking into account the 
full value of the property conveyed to the corporation, as a gift to her 
sons, b)' Emma Ireta Argyle. It took only the value of the assets 
contributed cit the time of incorporation, and at their ascribed 1963 
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values. It did not consider the 18 ,000 shares given to l\rthur by his 
mother. This was true even though the wife, who had some lilheritance 
(though she didn't know how much) had voluntarily relinquished her 
rights so that all of her father's property could go to her mother. The 
court, of course, can take into consideration property owned by the 
husband even when its acquired by a gift, but under the circumstances 
here, the award to the wife was excessive. 
CONCLUSION 
The wife had the burden of proving the value of the husband's 
assets to be included in the marital estate. His assets consisted 
primarily of 43, 000 shares of stock in Argyle Ranch, Inc. , and the 
right to acquire an additional 21,500 shares upon payment of an 
additional $10 ,000, his rights in the stock being subject to an 
agreement entered into in 1963 giving to him and his brother Ralph the 
right to buy the shares of the other, if sold, at a price of $1. 00 per 
share. 





evidence was as 
piecemeal. The 
to the value of the underlying 
financial statements of Argyle 
Ranch, Inc. , relied upon by the trial court. do not reflect the value of 
the stock owned by Arthur Argyle. 
In arriving at the value of the stock the court should have taken 
into consideration the effect of the buy-sell agreement 
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Even assuming that the court's valuation is correct, which is a 
difficult assumption, the cash award as made by the court was unfair 
and confiscatory, well beyond the ability of the husband to pay. On 
the evidence before the court the only way that he would be able to 
pay it would be to have the corporation dissolved and its assets sold, 
and he cannot force that. The corporation's borrowing capacity is not 
sufficient to assist the husband as a shareholder in this regard, and 
neither are its profits. 
The court having made a finding not supported by the evidence 
and having abused its discretion in the method of making a cash award, 
the case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings, to determine the value of the stock and to arrive at a just 
and equitable method for awarding to the wife a fair share of the 
property acquired through the joint efforts of the couple. 
submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
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